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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE S'TATE OF UTAH 
ARTIE MISSIE BANKS, ' 
Plaintiff and Appellant, J 
(Case No. 
vs. ~ 10854 
HOY SHIVERS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Plaintiff and Appellant's Brief 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought for damages for an alleged 
assault and battery inflicted upon the plaintiff by the 
defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter came regularly on for trial before The 
Honorable Lewis Jones in the First Judicial District, 
County of Cache, the 29th day of December, 1966. The 
matter was tried to a Jury and the Jury's verdict was 
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff 
1 
on plaintiff's Complaint, and in favor of the 1 · 
d . P aintiu an agamst the defendant on defendant's c 
. ounte
1 
claim, no cause of action. Judgment was entered . · 
. 00~ 
verdict. 
The plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial"' 
the 4th day of January, 1967. Said motion was setf
111 
oral argument on the 16th day of January 1967 . 
' , an.' 
taken under advisement. Counsel for plaintiff wi 
requested to submit a Memorandum of law and a repti 
Memorandum was filed by counsel for defendant. Ti, 
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial was denied by tb 
court on the 6th day of February, 1967. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a decision from tfii, 
Court reversing the lower Court's ruling denying trr 
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and a judicial dete1 
mination of the definition of a civil assault in this Statt 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an Appeal by the plaintiff from a Jur: 
verdict entered in favor of the defendant and agairu 
the plaintiff on plaintiff's complaint, no cause of action 
The Record of Appeal consists of the pleadings an1 
material contained in the appeal cover, the depositiofr 
of the parties plus LuAnn Martinez, and the trial tm 
script. 
2 
From the trial transcript, the following facts ap-
pear: 
The incident in question occurred on or about the 
1gth day of April, 1966, in an apartment located on 
the Utah State University Campus designated par-
ticularly as Triad 13 I. 
The defendant in the company of Henry King 
came to the plaintiff's apartment for the purpose of 
having the plaintiff's roommate, Mary Graham, cook 
them some chicken. 
C pon arriYing in the apartment, the plaintiff was 
studymg at a table and the defendant commenced study-
ing on a couch across the room from the table .. Mr. 
I\. ing and Mary Graham removed themselves to the 
kitchen area of the apartment and proceeded to cook 
the chicken. 
Thereafter, LuAnn Martinez entered the apart-
ment. The defendant walked to the counter separating 
the living room area from the kitchen area and picked 
up some book markers. The plaintiff asked the def end-
ant to put them down which the defendant did, and 
plaintiff put them in her room and returned to the 
table. 
Mr. Shivers said, 
"Is there anything else on this counter that 
. ?" ( T ) is yours. pg. 16 . 
The plaintiff said, 
"If there is, just don't touch and I won't yell 
at you or anything. Don't touch anything." 
3 
The plaintiff testified that defendant ap 
. peared t be upset and he said, 1' 
"I ought to knock you up side of you, 
head." 1 napp) , 
The defendant then moved toward the 
8 
. 
plaintiff in a rapid movement clapping his hands e:::~· 
near her face. The plaintiff testified that he bare!: 
missed and that she was frightened and upset. (T P', 
17}. ~ 
The plaintiff then arose from her chair and starter] 
in the direction of the door where the defendant Wai 
headed. The plaintiff asked defendant to leave and lit 
ref used and leaned his chest against the plaintiff. TJi, 
plaintiff struck defendant in the mouth and the dP 
fendant pushed or struck the plaintiff in such a manner 
that she fell to the floor. 
The defendant started in the direction of plaintili 
and leaned over, striking her in the face, and grabbea 
the hands of plaintiff and the plaintiff attempted to kicli 
the defendant in the groin. At this point Henry Kini 
interfered and restrained the defendant. Plaintiff aro~e 
and retreated toward the wall by the kitchen. The 
defendant, after an interval of time had elapsed, in 
which he got "madder and madder" (T pg. 82) then 
grabbed the plaintiff by the throat and pushed her 
back against the wall. 
Plaintiff testified the defendant had been chokin~ 
her and it was hard for her to breathe while against 
the wall. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INSTRUCTION BY THE COURT 
TO THE JURY DEFINING A CIVIL AS-
SAULT \VAS AN ERROR IN LAW AS IT IN-
CORRECTLY DEFINED AN ASSAULT. 
The Court instructed the Jury as follows: 
'"An Assault is an unlawful attempt coupled 
,vith a present ability to commit an injury on the 
person of another." 
[t should be noted that this definition is identical 
to the definition of a criminal assault with the exception 
of the word "violent". A criminal assault is defined 
in Title 76, Chapter 7, Section 1: 
"An Assault is an unlawful attempt coupled 
with a present ability to commit a violent injury 
on the person of another." 
It is appellant's contention that the concepts of 
civil and criminal assault are not identical. The defi-
nitions are not interchangeable and that it was preju-
dicial and an error in law to instruct the Jury as afore-
mentioned. 
This Court in Ganaway vs. Salt Lake Dramatic 
Association, 17 Utah 37, 65 P830 (1898), reversed the 
trial court which had held for the plaintiff on the 
ground, among others, that an assault had been im-
properly defined. It is of importance to note that the 
definition of assault in this case was taken from the 
5 
laws of 1880 Section 4483. A · f review 0 thos 1 e aw, reflects that the definition was taken from the 
d d d pena1 co e an use as an accurate statement of th I , 
. ·1 t . 1 e a11 li1 CIVI ria . 
The defendant, Salt Lake Dramatic Assoc' 
1
· 
Ia lOii 
excepted to the charge as the word "unlawful" 
11
'&-
omitted. The record was not clear that the defend : 
an, 
may not have been prejudiced by the definition. Tht 
defendant removed the plaintiff from a reserved sea; 
in its theater and did not deny the use of force bu: 
rather in its answer suggested it was justified. . 
This case is clearly distinguishable from the cast 
at bar. In the case at bar, the plaintiff did not haw 
verdict in her favor while in the Salt Lake Dramatit 
Association case plaintiff did have a verdict in his favor. 
A satisfied plaintiff is less likely to complain of the 
definition of the alleged tort by which he recovers than 
the dissatisfied plaintiff. 
The only other case in Utah which by virtue of ar 
instruction the Court defines an assault is a criminal 
case. Oddly enough, the situation is the reverse. ln 
State vs. Barkas, 65 P2d 1130 (1937}, rather than 
adopting the criminal definition from the penal code 
the Court created a hybrid, half criminal and half civil. 
In employing the definition from WORDS AND 
PHRASES, the Courts defined simple assault as: 
"That which is a threat or attempt to interfere 
with one's sense or feeling of physical secur1fy 
and to put one in fear for his safety." 
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Had the Court omitted the word "attempt", it 
would have accurately defined a civil assault consistent 
with the prevailing view. 
In the Barkas case, the defendant bitterly assails 
the trial court's refusal to instruct on a lesser included 
offense to Assault with a Deadly Weapon with Intent 
to do Bodily Harm. Refusal to so instruct was held 
reversible error. It is interesting to note that the Court 
in its reasoning in a criminal case said that a simple 
assault could be made out if the defendant intended 
to frighten or intimidate the victim. At first glance 
it would thus appear that the case law in Utah is in 
hopeless irreconcilable conflict unless the Barkas case 
supra being the latest statement of the Court is con-
trolling. 
The American Law Institute's Restatement of the 
Law of Torts in defining a civil assault Section 21 
Subsection 1, states: 
"An act, other than the mere speaking of 
words, which directly or indirectly is a legal cause 
of putting another in apprehension of an imme-
diate and harmful or offensive contact renders 
the actor civilly liable, if he intends thereby to 
inflict a harmful or offensive contact upon the 
other or a third person or to put the other or a 
third person in apprehension thereof, and the 
act is not consented to by the other, and the act 
is not otherwise privileged." 
American Jurisprudence 2nd Volume 6 Section 
110 states that the above definition is the prevailing 
view taken in most jurisdictions. 
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The very crux of the civil law for an assa It . 
U · lS lir' an attempted battery, which implies the sw· . !' 
. b l . Ing tha· misses, ut t 1e creation of apprehension or f · , 
. . . ear in t11t 
plamtiff of an off ens1ve contract. It should also b , · 
e no\e11 
that apparent ability to consummate the tou 1 · . 
. . ~ c 110g ~. 
all that is reqmred. 'I he Court instructed the J ury. 
the case at bar that present ability should be fou ·d 1.· 
n. 
Prosser, Law of Torts 2nd Edition (1955) SPc. 
tion 10, after adopting the Restatement view c 
' fJU1 
men ts as follows: 
"The interest in f~eedom from apprehensioi 
of a ~a!mf~l or offensive contact with the persou 
as d1stmgmshed from the contact, itself, is pro 
tected by an action for the tort known as ,
1
, 
assault. No actual contact is necessary, and t\
1
, 
plaintiff is protected against a purely menta. 
disturbance of his personal integrity." 
Because criminal statutes use the term "assault 
they are frequently misapplied to civil actions as ii 
the case at bar and prejudicial when used and incluat 
attempted battery. 
The initial conduct in this case was a movemem 
across the room towards the person of the plainhft. 
the clapping of the defendant's hands in close proxim· 
ity to plaintiff's face, preceded by the defendant's state· 
ment, "I ought to knock you up the side of your napp: 
head" ( T pg. 17). This conduct induced fear in thr 
plaintiff and a civil assault occurred. But if the criminal 
definition were applied, attempted battery, the oppo· 
site result could be obtained as the defendant testifiea. 
8 
''I did not intend to touch her." (T. pg. 78). The 
definition given suggests one must intent to hit and be 
unsuccessful before an assault occurs. The instruction 
places too much emphasis upon the defendant's physical 
~10vement which barely missed its mark. The words 
mav be inoffensive by themselves but accompanied by 
the. moYement the event takes on a hostile character. 
The words and the act together created apprehension 
:11 the appellant and an assault had occurred. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING AP-
PELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
AS THE 'VEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE JUS-
TIFIED A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE DEFEND-
ANT. 
The defendant, a 195 lb. male (T. pg. 79) pro-
fessional football player (T. pg. 86) committed on two 
separate occasions in the same incident an assault and 
battery upon the female plaintiff. The latter occasion 
occurred after the plaintiff's retreat and an elapsed 
period of time in which the defendant had an oppor-
tunity to reflect upon his action and to deliberately 
proceed possessing greatly superior physical ability. 
The door to the apartment was close at hand 
throughout the incident and the defendant's own testi-
mony (T pg. 77) was such that he could have walked 
to the door and presumably left the apartment. 
9 
The defendant clearly used force which .. 
. w~~~ 
s1ve as stated by the Restatement (Restatement T. ,'· 
S 70 1) . . . ' O,j, ec. a person is not privileged to use a 
f If d f I 
. h . . ny meai, 
o se - e ense w uc is mtended or likelv t · · 
. • o cause 
bodily harm or confinement in excess of that i · h ,, wnc 1, 
correctly or reasonably believes to be necess · . . ary tri 
his protect10n. The defendant herein was exces · l. 
• SIVe 111 
use of his force and as such was vindictive under 
111
, 
circumstances. 
In determining whether any reasonable force wa 
used by the defendant claiming to have acted in 
defense, the relative physical strength and sex are 1
1
, 
be taken into consideration. Phoenix vs. Carey, 1u,' 
So 2d 268. 
It is appellant's position that at no time did ti 
defendant have the right to invoke the defense of seli 
defense. The manner of handling a woman might con· 
stitute excessive force where it would not if the assaile,J' 
party were a man. 6 ALR 997, Annotation. 
Clearly, here the defendant was the aggressor ano 
he cannot justify his conduct on the ground of sell 
defense unless he in good faith withdrew. 
An examination of the record does not support: 
withdrawal at any time by the defendant, but support1 
such a withdrawal by the plaintiff. The initial conduct 
in appellant's opinion constituted an assault. The affrai 
by the doorway, at best, can be said to be a ~nfl.1: 
which the trier of fact resolved against the pla1ntin 
10 
S lJstantial conflict exists regarding the conduct on the 'l], 
lioor. However, no conflict exists as to the force em-
ployed in directing the plaintiff's person to the floor. 
'fhe latter occasion, upon which the defendant can-
not interject the defense of self-defense in an effort 
to clothe his conduct in propriety, unequivocally was 
;1n assault and battery upon the plaintiff. The previous 
,:·xamination of the doctrine of self-defense coupled with 
the reading of the record support this contention as to 
1he latter occasion of which no conflict in the testimony 
existed. 
The plaintiff testified ( T pg. 21) that 4-5 min-
:ites had elapsed from the scuffle on the floor to the 
eonunencement of the second half of the incident. Lu-
Ann Martinez testified that less than 1h minute elapsed 
IT pg. 37) but the testimony of the witnesses were 
unanimous that the plaintiff appeared scared and that 
defendant was becoming more upset during the interval 
the affray was dormant. The defendant's subsequent 
conduct in placing his hands on plaintiff's throat, chok-
ing her, and then pushing her back against the wall was 
an assault and battery. 
The creation of the apprehension in the person 
of the plaintiff of a harmful touching coupled with 
the actual touching was completed. The interest which 
is attempted to be protected by the tort of assault, that 
is, the apprehension of a touching and the interest in 
the individual in freedom from bodily harm had been 
Yiolated. The defendant's conduct here offends the 
11 
reasonable sense of personal dignity which should!: 
respected. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff-appellant seeks to have this c ouri 
rule as a matter of law the definition of an assault" 
civil case and the granting of a new trial. Appellai,' 
respectfully submits that the defendant's conduct 
11
; 
tortious upon the person of the plaintiff and to sushi! 
the trial court's denial of a Motion for a New Tn~. 
is contrary to the law and evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KARRAS, VAN SCIVER & YOCOli 
Robert Van Seiver 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellan 
661 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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